Tuesday, June 3, 2008

One God Apart

God: The Greatest Question

Man is a creature with needs and desires. As such, we have always sought both comfort and truth—since we like to feel special and we also possess a natural desire for knowledge. With regards to this, different cultures in separate regions throughout time have gone about in very peculiar ways to find out why nature works as it does and trying to unite how it relates to us. The result has been a rich pantheon of gods throughout history—from Apollo to Zeus—as well as a variety of religious traditions in honor of these deities.

Today, of course, many of these so-called gods are rightly seen as manmade fabrications. Take for instance the Greek gods we find in a typical mythology book. Their purpose was oftentimes to explain different sorts of mysterious phenomena such as lightning and fire. As such, they were invoked to bridge the gaps of our knowledge. However, as soon as science started telling us how things work, they were rendered more and more useless. By simply utilizing Ockham’s razor, there was no rational choice but to disbelieve in such deities. But science, of course, will never eliminate one particular divinity.

Philosopher G.W. von Leibniz famously asked “Why is there is there something rather than nothing?” The question, I believe, can be tied to the existence of this “God” that science cannot reject or discover. This is because the God I speak of is one that is the source and reason for all of nature in general, whether directly or indirectly. Lying outside the limits of the scientific method, i.e. the natural world, the question of this God’s existence is one of philosophical interest and will never be eliminated by scientific advances.

But why is the topic philosophical? There is a whole host of reasons. Take, for instance, the way it impacts our ethics. If there is a God, particularly one which is personal and cares for us, such as the one espoused by the Judeo-Christian tradition, it is quite obvious that we would have to act in a specific way during our short stays on Earth. If there is no God, then it may very well be possible, to paraphrase Dostoevsky that “everything is permitted.” As such, the proper way to live is influenced by whether or not God exists. This then influences our views on equality, liberty, justice, and other topics of philosophical interest.

The existence of God would also potentially impact our notions of matter. If there is a God, for instance, then reductionist materialism like that of Daniel Dennett would have to be flatly rejected unless God is a placeholder for the word “nature,” as a pantheist may believe. God’s substance would have to be non-physical, i.e. spiritual, and this would force us to accept the possibility of people having souls, which like God, would have to be real and outside of time, or eternal.

The existence of God is also a philosophical topic because the answer can give us clues to the deepest questions our reason can ever come up with. For instance, it is not hard to accept that a nihilist’s depressing views on life would be radically altered if he or she found some revelation from God. As such, it is the case that God impacts the way we should conceive of both of ourselves and nature in general. Questions that deal with such issues are the ultimate “Why” questions, which are those which we want to know the answer to the most. These deal with our purpose, the purpose of the cosmos, as well as the meaning of it all. Therefore, we can claim with much confidence that God’s existence is in a sense the ultimate topic in philosophy.

It should come as no surprise then that philosophers have tried hard to come up with solutions to the issue of God's existence. A notable example is found in St. Thomas Aquinas, the Catholic Aristotelian who formulated “Five Ways” to affirm the existence of God. As a man of faith, his “Ways” should not to be seen as distinct and rock-solid rational proofs for God. Nevertheless, they are often seen in such a light and are thus prone to severe misinterpretation. What I wish to do is highlight two of his ways. One will be that which appears to me most convincing as well as that which is most sorely lacking. Contrasting such modes of demonstrating God will allow us to see very different approaches to the issue and will let us make a balanced judgment of what Aquinas wishes to express.

In my opinion, the most convincing demonstration offered by Aquinas is the second way, which stems from “the nature of efficient cause” (526). In it, he claims that there must have necessarily been a first cause which allowed all the effects with intermediate causes to ultimately occur. This cause must exist in order to avoid effect-negating infinite regresses. To clarify this, one need only read his well-put wording:

“Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the immediate cause be several or one only.”

What is it that makes it convincing? The answer is simple, there really does not appear to be a clear-cut logical way around it. Opposing it seems to entail either thinking that not all effects have causes, that there is an infinity of previous causes, or that something is the efficient cause of itself. Let us see how effective this really is, though.

Suppose we believe the first possible objection, namely that not all effects must have a cause. Would this not entail, that the universe, or Big Bang, could have popped into being ex nihilo? Defenders of this view will say that phrasing it in such a way is erroneous, since the Big Bang was the beginning of both space and time. But still, is there a doubt that admitting such a possibility still entails assuming something causes itself unless it is eternal? Aquinas makes a good case for rejecting such a notion, as he writes that there “is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.” This is not to say the problem is totally solved, but it is certainly difficult to rationally give credence to a wholly causeless event with a particular origin.

As for Aquinas’ weakest way to demonstrate God’s existence, I point to the fourth way. The fourth way deals with “the gradation to be found in things.” It essentially claims that since some things are certain ways, they are all reflective in different degrees of that which most possesses such a certain quality. Aquinas writes that it is “as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest” (526-527). Therefore, it follows that there is something “which is truest, something best, something noblest, and consequently, something which is most being.” This of course, is said to be God.

I find the fourth way unconvincing because it simply treats evil as privation instead of giving it enough consideration. I believe that had Aquinas carried things out more efficiently, he may have to had to conclude that there is something along the existence of an anti-God, assuming God is as described. This is because had he seen evil as something that is not just a privation of something else, he would had to accept that which is most ignoble and worst. On the other hand, as Professor Gabbey said, Aquinas could simply have posited that goodness is a privation of evil. I believe the proof does not deserve much more consideration in helping conclude something about God’s existence, since it appears to sidestep the issue of evil’s relation to goodness and God.

Judging by the two ways seen above, Aquinas certainly had different approaches to the issue of God, at times sounding very convincing and at others sadly unconvincing. Are his two ways, along with the other three, totally demonstrative of God? Probably not, as these have been at our disposal for quite a while and debate still goes on over each and every one of the five ways. But at the very least what we see in action is a philosopher performing the highest kind of philosophy, since what Aquinas seeks to make understandable is an object of faith that has the greatest implications on everything we can imagine. Therefore, even if not entirely convincing, his effort is entirely commendable.

WORK CITED

Aquinas, Thomas. “Latin Philosophy in the Thirteenth Century” Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions. Ed. Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh.

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986.